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This paper examines the effects of providing financial 
services to low-income individuals on entrepreneurial 
activity, employment, and income. The analysis exploits 
cross-time and cross-municipality variation in the 
opening of Banco Azteca in Mexico to measure these 
effects with a difference-in-difference strategy. Banco 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to understand the economic impact of expanding access to finance. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mbruhn@worldbank.org or 
ilove@worldbank.org.
Azteca opened more than 800 branches simultaneously in 
2002, focusing on low-income clients. The results show 
that the opening of Banco Azteca led to an increase in the 
number of informal business owners by 7.6 percent. Total 
employment also increased, by 1.4 percent, and average 
income went up by about 7 percent. 
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Introduction 
Several recent papers have found a positive correlation between access to finance and 
firm creation, economic growth, and poverty alleviation at the country level (World Bank, 
2008, Honohan, 2004). However, these papers tend to face identification issues, implying 
that they do not necessarily establish a causal impact of increasing access to finance on 
economic outcomes. Similarly, while the microfinance industry has grown exponentially in 
the past few decades and a number of researchers have written on the topic,
1 there is still 
little systematic evidence on the casual impact of microfinance on economic activity 
(Harford, 2008, Karlan and Morduch, 2009). There is also little evidence on the channels 
through which finance may help to reduce poverty.  
In this paper we use a unique event to evaluate the effect of increased access to 
financial services for low-income individuals on entrepreneurial activity, employment, and 
income. Specifically, we evaluate the effect of the opening of Banco Azteca in Mexico in 
October 2002. This event was unique in that Banco Azteca opened branches in all of the 
existing stores of its parent company – a large retailer of consumer goods, Grupo Elektra. 
Almost overnight, Banco Azteca established the second largest network of branches in the 
country. This set a world record of a bank opening more than 800 branches at once.  
An important feature of Banco Azteca was that from the start it catered to low and 
middle-income groups which had mostly been excluded from the commercial banking 
sector
2. Capitalizing on the Grupo Elektra’s decades of experience in making small 
installment loans for its merchandize, rich data, and established information and collection 
technology, the bank was uniquely positioned to target this segment of the population, which 
it estimated to comprise over 70% of total households. Many of these households were part 
of the informal economy – operating small informal businesses that lacked the 
documentation necessary for obtaining bank loans. The nature of Azteca’s operations, 
including low documentation requirements and the motorcycle-riding loan officers that come 
to the borrower’s house, as well as the size of the loans offered make it comparable to 
microfinance institutions that operated in Mexico at the time of Azteca opening.  
                                                 
1 See for example Pitt and Khandker (1998), Coleman (1999), Kaboski and Townsend (2005), McKernan 
(2002), and Pitt, Khandker, Chowdury, and Millimet (2003b). 
2 In fact, Banco Azteca’s motto is “We changed banking, now it’s your time to change” (“Cambiamos la banca, 
cambia tú también”).   3
We use the predetermined nature of the branch locations – which were opened in all 
stores of its parent company, Grupo Elektra - to identify the casual impact of Azteca opening 
on economic activity through a difference-in-difference strategy. Specifically, we compare 
the changes in outcome variables before and after Azteca opening across municipalities with 
pre-existing Grupo Elektra branches and those without branches at a time of the bank 
opening. Our analysis controls for the possibility that time trends in the outcome variables 
may be different in municipalities that had Grupo Elektra branches and from time trends in 
municipalities that did not have Grupo Elektra branches. Using the Mexican Labor Market 
Survey, ENE, we study the impact of this event on individuals’ employment choices and 
income levels.  
Our results show that the new bank opening led to an increase in the proportion of 
informal businesses by 7.6 percent, but to no change in formal businesses. This is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence suggesting that Azteca targeted lower-income individuals and also 
with Azteca’s low documentation requirements. In contrast, formal business owners have 
easier access to commercial bank credit, and likely prefer it because of higher interest rates 
charged by Azteca
3.  
Second, the increase in informal businesses is only significant for men. However, we 
find a higher proportion of women working as wage-earners in municipalities with Azteca 
branches after its opening. This possibly signifies an expansion of labor market opportunities 
for women, from house makers to paid staff, perhaps in the informal businesses owned by 
their husbands or other male family members. Overall, total employment, including informal 
business owners and wage earners, rose by 1.4 percent for the complete sample. 
Third, the new bank opening led to higher income levels for both men and women by 
about 7 percent. Similarly to this result, Burgess and Pande (2005) find that the expansion of 
bank branches in rural India had a significant impact on alleviating poverty, although Kochar 
(2005) and Panagariya (2006) cast doubt on their findings. 
While Burgess and Pande do not examine the channel through which increased bank 
presence alleviates poverty, we are able to investigate the effect of Banco Azteca opening in 
more detail, by considering how the impact varies with pre-event occupation. We find that 
                                                 
3 Azteca charged interest rates of about 50 percent per annum, while commercial banks at the time charged rates 
of 20 to 40 percent. However, commercial banks rejected all but the most creditworthy customers (The Dallas 
Morning News, 31 October 2002.)   4
the increased availability of financial services helped existing informal business owners to 
continue their operations instead of closing their business and transitioning to being the 
wage-earners or not employed. This is consistent with evidence suggesting that micro 
entrepreneurs have very high rates of return on capital, and hence would benefit from 
increased access to finance (See McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008, and De Mel, McKenzie, and 
Woodruff, 2008)
4. 
Perhaps most importantly, Banco Azteca opening led to a reduction in the proportion 
of not employed individuals and increased income for this segment of the population.
5 This is 
because some previously not employed individuals opened informal business and others were 
more likely to work as wage earners after Banco Azteca opening. These results on 
employment and income mirror Karlan and Zinman’s (2007) finding that increased 
availability of consumer credit has a range of positive outcomes on the household well-being, 
including an increased ability to retain employment and increased income. The Karlan and 
Zinman analysis includes only individuals that work as wage earners. Our study, however, 
shows that increased access to finance has positive effects on self-employment, as well as on 
wage work. 
It is important to point out that our paper does not establish whether the new bank 
opening had a direct impact, which it might have had given its large scale of the operations, 
or an indirect one – i.e. via improvement in the competition in the local financial sector. 
Azteca was probably competing for clients with existing microfinance organizations and 
credit unions. Thus, the impact on the economic outcomes we observe could have stemmed 
from the access to credit and savings provided by Azteca, or by a number of other financial 
institutions
6. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests that improving access to low income 
households has a significant impact on the labor market and income levels. 
                                                 
4 Our findings are also consistent with Banerjee and Duflo (2004) who use an exogenous change in regulation 
that made credit more available to some firms to show that this increase credit led to an increase in firms’ sales 
and profits. The firms in their sample are, however, larger firms, receiving credit from traditional banks. 
5 Our results on income are not as strong as our results on employment choices because of the nature of the data. 
The dataset we use is designed to measure labor market participation rather then household income or 
consumption. This implies that the quality of the labor market participation data is likely to be higher than the 
quality of income data available in the survey.  
6 We have not been able to examine the market response to Azteca opening by microfinance institutions and 
credit unions since we do not have data on these institutions at the municipality level.   5
Our paper is related to a literature on US banking deregulation, which exploits the 
natural experiment of gradual relaxation of restrictions on state-wide branching and on 
entrance by out of state banks.  This relaxation of restrictions resulted in increased presence 
of banks in different states, which is somewhat akin to the entry of Banco Azteca. Some of 
the results of this literature parallel ours: Jayarathne and Strahan (1996) find an increase in 
the economic growth rate by 0.51-1.19%, Black and Strahan (2002) find an increase in new 
firm incorporations by up to 8%.  
Also closely related to our work, Beck, Levine and Levkov (2007) find that banking 
deregulation resulted in a reduction in income inequality through the impact on labor market 
conditions. In particular, they find a reduction in the income gap between men and women, 
which parallels our results about increased employment opportunities for women. While we 
don’t test for this directly in this paper, the entrance of Banzo Azteca has likely led to 
increased bank competition, similar to what Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find in the US: they 
argue that deregulation has led to increased competition and a larger presence of small firms. 
Despite some similarities with previous research, the unique feature of Banco Azteca, namely 
the targeting of low income, previously unbanked indivduals, make it an important case for 
studying the real effects of bank expansion.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a brief background on 
Banco Azteca opening and its impact on the financial sector, while the Appendix contains a 
more detailed description of Banco Azteca’s features. Section 2 lays out our empirical 
strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our regression results, and Section 5 
concludes.  
 
I. Background on Banco Azteca 
In March 2002, one of Mexico’s largest retailers for electronics and household goods, 
Grupo Elektra, received a banking license. In October 2002, Grupo Elektra launched Banco 
Azteca, opening a total of 815 branches in all pre-existing Grupo Elektra stores.  
From the outset, Banco Azteca targeted low and middle-income customers, 
historically underserved by the traditional banking industry. (See the Appendix for more 
details and quotes from Azteca founders and top management). With an extensive database 
of 4 million current and past Grupo Elektra customers, and a fleet of 3,000 motorcycle-riding   6
loan collection agents, Banco Azteca was able to extend credit to segments of the low-
income population that were previously un-bankable. Azteca also requires less 
documentation than traditional commercial banks, often taking a co-signer instead of valid 
documents. Even today, many of its customers are informal business owners who do not have 
the proof of income required by other banks. 
Azteca began its operations by offering savings accounts targeted to low-income 
customers that could be opened with as little as $5. Within the first month, 157,000 accounts 
were opened, increasing to 250,000 accounts by the end of December 2002. At its opening in 
October 2002, Banco Azteca also took over the issuance of installment loans, which were 
previously issued by Elektrafin, the financing unit Grupo Elektra’s retails stores. These loans 
had an average amount of $250. Although these loans were tied to merchandize, they could 
be used for business purposes. For example, purchasing a new sewing machine or a fridge 
might allow a person to start or to sustain their micro business. In 2003, Azteca started 
offering $500 consumer loans not tied to the merchandize. These amounts were comparable 
in size to loans offered by several microfinance organizations, which in 2002 amounted to 
about $360.
7 Towards the end of 2003, Azteca also expanded into the mortgage and 
insurance business. 
Although Grupo Elektra was disbursing installment loans before opening Banco 
Azteca, Banco Azteca’s new savings accounts allowed its loan portfolio to expand 
significantly. Figure 1 plots Grupo Elektra’s loan portfolio within Mexico over time, showing 
a steep increase from the fourth quarter of 2002 on. The loan portfolio increased from around 
2 billion Mexican pesos at the time of opening Banco Azteca to 10 billion Mexican pesos in 
the last quarter of 2004. Although this portfolio size is small compared to the total 
commercial bank credit to the private sector, which was about 550 billion Mexican pesos in 
the fourth quarter of 2002, it is large compared to the credit disbursed by smaller institutions 
which cater to low-income households. The combined portfolio of the largest microfinance 
institutions in Mexico stood at only 0.5 billion Mexican pesos in the fourth quarter of 2004. 
In this same quarter, the total amount of outstanding loans from credit unions was 8.7 billion 
Mexican pesos. 
                                                 
7 Microfinance loan size is average for all microfinance institutions available on MIXmarket.org   7
Figure 2 shows the relative difference in the number of savings accounts in 
municipalities with Azteca, vs. municipalities without Azteca. Data on savings accounts 
comes from the Mexican bank supervisory body, the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de 
Valores (CNBV). There is a clear rapid growth in savings accounts in municipalities with 
Azteca after December 2002
8. These effects are also significant in a regression framework 
that controls for municipality-specific time trends
9. 
Thus, the opening of Banco Azteca had a non-trivial impact on availability of 
financial services in municipalities where the branches were present. More details on the 
bank opening are available in the Appendix.  
 
II. Identification Strategy 
In order to identify the effect of Banco Azteca opening on economic activity, we 
exploit the cross-municipality and cross-time variation in Azteca branches. As discussed 
above, Banco Azteca opened in October 2002, only in the municipalities that had pre-exiting 
Grupo Elektra stores. This allows us to estimate the following difference-in-difference 
regression, which compares municipalities with and without Banco Azteca before and after 
Azteca opening: 
ict ict ct t c ict Z Azteca y             * *,  
where i denotes individuals, c denotes municipalities, and t denotes quarters. ß is a set of 
municipality fixed effects, γ is a set of quarter fixed effects and Z is a matrix of individual 
control variables. Our main variable of interest is the Azteca dummy, which is the interaction 
between a post third quarter of 2002 dummy and a dummy that equals one for municipalities 
that had at least one Azteca branch in the fourth quarter of 2002 and that equals zero for all 
other municipalities in our sample. The coefficient δ is our estimate of the effect of Banco 
Azteca opening
10. We cluster standard errors at the municipality level. 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, we cannot perform the same regression analysis for loans since we do not have date on loans 
pre- and post-Azteca opening at the municipality level.  
9 Available from the authors upon request. 
10 An alternative strategy would be to interact the post-Azteca opening dummy with the number of Azteca 
branches (which is equivalent to Grupo Elektra stores) in each municipality in the fourth quarter of 2002. 
However, we do not have accurate data on the number of Azteca branches or Grupo Elektra stores for the fourth 
quarter of 2002.    8
The assumption needed to guarantee that this identification strategy is valid is that, in 
the absence of Banco Azteca opening, the average difference between outcome variables 
across municipalities with and without Azteca would have been the same post-October 2002 
as pre-October 2002. That is, outcome variables can differ in levels across municipalities 
with and without Azteca, but they cannot differ in changes. 
This assumption would be violated if, for example, the number of informal businesses 
were on a steeper growth path in municipalities with Azteca than in municipalities without 
Azteca. If this were the case, we could detect a positive effect of Banco Azteca opening on 
the number of informal businesses, when there was actually no effect. 
While the identification assumption is fundamentally untestable since we do not 
observe the counterfactual of Banco Azteca not having opened, we verify whether the 
assumption is likely to hold in three different ways. First, as is common in the literature, we 
test for parallel pre-event trends in outcome variables across municipalities with and without 
Azteca. If the changes were the same in the pre-period, they are likely to have remained the 
same in the post-period in the absence of Azteca opening.  
Second, we run regressions that control for the possibility of municipalities with and 
without Azteca having different linear time trends. If our estimated effects are driven entirely 
by differences in trends, then these effects should disappear once we control for time trends 
in the regressions. We do this in two ways: First, we allow all municipalities with Azteca 
branch to have the same time trend, and all municipalities without Azteca branch to have a 
different time trend. Second, we allow each municipality to have its own time-trend (i.e. 
municipality-specific time-trends). 
Finally, we examine graphically whether the estimated change in outcome variables 
in municipalities with Banco Azteca coincides with the time of Banco Azteca opening. 
 
III. Data 
All of our main outcome variables come from the Mexican National Employment 
Survey (ENE). The ENE is the survey that the Mexican government relies on for calculating 
unemployment statistics and for measuring the size of the informal sector. It has been 
conducted quarterly since 2000-II and covers a random sample of approximately 150,000 
households each quarter. Households remain in the survey for five consecutive quarters. We   9
use data for 2000-II to 2004-IV (19 quarters in total). After 2004-IV, the ENE was changed 
to a new survey
11. 
We chose to use the ENE data in our analysis for the following reasons. First, it 
includes detailed questions about a person's economic activity (including self-employment), 
and it also reports a person’s income from their main occupation. Second, it captures and 
distinguishes between formal and informal self-employment and firms, making it possible to 
investigate the effect of Banco Azteca on informal firms. This is important since anecdotal 
reports mentioned in the Appendix suggest that many Banco Azteca clients are informal 
business owners. Third, the ENE covers a wide range of municipalities for 10 quarters before 
Banco Azteca opened and 9 quarters after, allowing us to implement the identification 
strategy described above
12. Forth, the panel structure of the ENE allows us to describe the 
effect of Banco Azteca more precisely by looking at the impact on different pre-reform 
occupation groups. 
  The ENE covers a total of 1,222 municipalities, but we drop the ones that do not have 
any bank since we feel that they would be less comparable to the municipalities with Azteca. 
We determine which municipalities had a bank branch in the fourth quarter of 2002 and 
which had an Azteca branch by referring to data from the Mexican bank supervisory body, 
the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV). Our final sample includes 576 
municipalities, of which 249 had an Azteca branch in fourth quarter of 2002, and 327 did not 
have an Azteca branch, but had a branch of a different bank. Almost all the municipalities 
where Azteca opened also had a branch of a different bank. Only 6 out of the 249 Azteca 
municipalities in our data did not also have a different bank branch.
13 Figure 3 shows a map 
                                                 
11 There are two reasons why we do not use data from the new survey. First, the question that distinguishes 
informal from formal business owners is different in the new survey, implying that one of our main outcome 
variables is not conistent across the two surveys. Second, Banco Azteca started opening new branches after 
initially establishing branches in all pre-exisiting Elektra store. This means that our identification strategy is less 
valid for later years.,  
12 It is important to point out that the way the ENE sample is constructed implies that a municipality-year 
average is not necessarily representative of the municipality in that year. The sample selection procedure 
randomly selects households at a small geographic unit, the AGEB (Basic Geo-Statistical Area). All AGEBs 
within a state are first stratified by socioeconomic characteristics. Within each stratum, a certain number of 
AGEBs is chosen at random. Then, households are chosen at random within the AGEB. This procedure implies 
that it could happen that only some socioeconomic groups get selected in a given municipality in a given year. 
However, since the strata are randomly chosen, this remains in expectation a random sample of the households 
in a municipality, so that the estimate should remain unbiased. 
13 There are a total of 2,451 municipalities in Mexico, but the ENE does not cover all of them. The ENE is 
representative for cities, but only includes a random sample of rural municipalities. A total of 696 municipalities   10
of Mexico where municipalities that had an Azteca branch in the fourth quarter of 2002 are 
marked in dark blue, and municipalities that had a different bank branch, but no Azteca 
branch, are marked in light blue. Both types of municipalities are distributed throughout 
Mexico.  
  Since our analysis applies to potential Banco Azteca clients who could be 
economically active, we keep only individuals of working age (between the ages of 20 and 
65) in our sample. We then construct three of our main outcome variables by creating 
dummy variables for each person in the sample, indicating whether the person a) owns an 
informal business, b) owns a formal business, and c) is a wage earner
14. These are the three 
possible occupations for somebody who is employed. People who do not fall into either of 
these categories are not employed (they are either unemployed or not in the labor force).  
  All dummies are defined for the whole sample, meaning that they denote the 
percentage of all individuals in the sample who fall into each category. For example, a value 
of 0.08 of the formal business owner dummy means that 8 percent of all people between the 
ages of 20 and 65 own a formal business. 
  Finally, we also use monthly income as an outcome variable. While the dummy 
variables are defined for everybody in our sample, income is available only for the gainfully 
employed and is missing for the unemployed, for individuals who are out of the labor force, 
and for unpaid workers. Unfortunately, the income data from the ENE is probably not as 
reliable as the occupation data since it is not the focus of the survey. The survey only 
includes one question on income, asking for the earnings from the individual’s main 
occupation. 4.2 percent of employed individuals do not answer this question. These 
individuals are then asked to report their income in terms of bins of the minimum wage. 
About 60 percent of the people who did not report their income in the first question report it 
in terms of the minimum wage (2.4 percent of the total sample). Taking these responses into 
account, we create a dummy variable indicating whether an individual earns above minimum 
wage
15. We use this as an additional outcome variable. 
                                                                                                                                                       
had a bank branch in Mexico in the fourth quarter of 2002, 120 of which are not covered in our data. However, 
only 8 municipalities that had an Azteca branch are not in our data. 
14 A detailed description of how these variables were constructed is available in Bruhn (2008). 
15 We convert the incomes of the 95.8 percent individuals who reported them as amounts to multiples of the 
minimum wage using information on the minimum wage from the National Commission for Minimum Wages 
(Comision Nacional de Salarios Minimos, CONASAMI, http://www.conasami.gob.mx).   11
The upper panel of Table 1 includes summary statistics for the outcome variables 
split up by municipalities that had at least one Azteca branch in the fourth quarter of 2002 
and by municipalities that didn’t have any Azteca branch at that time, but that had at least 
one branch from a different bank. The data in Table 1 are for the pre-Banco Azteca period, 
including only observations between 2000-II and 2002-III. The averages in Columns 1 and 2 
of Table 1 show that, in municipalities with Azteca, 8.2 percent of people in the sample 
owned an informal business in the pre-Azteca period. This number was higher for 
municipalities without Azteca, 13.8 percent. There is a somewhat smaller percentage of 
formal business owners, 7.9 in municipalities with Azteca and 6.6 in other municipalities. 
Another 50 (44) percent of our sample worked as wage earners in municipalities with 
(without) Azteca. The remaining 34 (36) percent of the sample were not employed.  
  The third column of Table 1 reports the differences in pre-reform averages for 
municipalities with and without Azteca and their statistical significance. Individuals who live 
in municipalities with Azteca are more likely to be employed, more likely to work as wage 
earners, and more likely to own a registered business. However, they are less likely to own 
an informal business. Moreover, individuals in municipalities with Azteca have a higher 
average monthly income than individuals in municipalities without Azteca. 
  The fact that pre-Azteca outcomes were different across our group of treatment and 
control municipalities does not invalidate the identification strategy. As discussed in Section 
II above, the identification strategy assumes that changes in outcome variables (not levels) 
are the same in municipalities with and without Azteca. The lower panel of Table 1 compares 
pre-period changes in outcome variables across Azteca and non-Azteca municipalities. There 
was no statistically significant difference in average changes across these municipalities for 
the informal and formal business owner dummies. The fraction of wage earners, however, 
decreased in Azteca municipalities in the pre-Azteca period, while it increased in non-Azteca 
municipalities. This is also reflected in the fact that the fraction of people who are not 
employed increased in Azteca municipalities while it decreased in non-Azteca municipalities. 
These differences in changes are statistically significant and would bias our results against 
finding a positive effect on the fraction of wage earners. Similarly, the fraction of people who 
earn above minimum wage and also log income increased more in non-Azteca municipalities 
than in Azteca municipalities, which could also bias our results against finding a positive   12
effect on these income variables. In our regressions, we control for different linear time 
trends in Azteca and non-Azteca municipalities to correct for these biases. Overall, there is 
no indication that differences in trends across municipalities could lead us to find a positive 
effect that is not actually there, implying that our estimates are on the conservative side. 
  We also use a number of individual background variables from the ENE as control 
variables in the regressions. These variables include age, gender, marital status, and 
education dummies. Summary statistics for these background variables and their pre-period 




IV. a. Business Owners 
We first investigate the impact of Banco Azteca opening on entrepreneurial activity. 
Table 2 presents the results for the informal and formal business owner dummies as 
dependent variables. We find that the opening of Banco Azteca had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the fraction of informal business owners. The coefficient on 
our variable of interest remains statistically significant and similar in size when we include a 
separate time trend for the group of Azteca and non-Azteca municipalities in the regressions 
(Column2). The coefficient is also similar when including municipality specific time trends 
(Column 3). Overall, the results suggest that the opening of Banco Azteca increased the 
fraction of informal business owners by 0.0062, which corresponds to 7.6 percent of the pre-
Azteca fraction of 0.082. 
The effect on registered business owners is negative in the specification without time 
trends, but this effect is not robust to including time trends in the regression. It is perhaps not 
surprising that the fraction of formal business owners did not increase due to Banco Azteca 
opening. In contrast to informal business owners, formal business owners typically have 
access to commercial banks, since they have the necessary documentation, and commercial 
banks tend to offer lower interest rates. 
  Figure 4 is a graphic illustration of the effect of Banco Azteca opening on the fraction 
of informal business owners. It displays the fraction of informal business owners in 
municipalities with and without an Azteca branch in 2002-IV over time. We observe a steep   13
increase in the fraction of informal business owners only in Azteca municipalities after 
Banco Azteca opened, while there were no differences in the two trends before Azteca 
opening.  
  Thus, our first set of results suggests that the opening of a new bank geared towards 
low income individuals has benefitted informal entrepreneurs. This is perhaps not surprising, 
as Banco Azteca targeted exactly this segment of the population (see Appendix).  
When we split our sample by gender, we find that only men are more likely to work 
as informal business owners after Banco Azteca opened. The results for women are not 
statistically significant, while the results for men are strongly significant (Table 2 Panels B 
and C)
16. Before Banco Azteca opened, 67.32 percent of informal business owners were men, 
and 12.63 percent of men owned an informal business. After Banco Azteca openend, the 
fraction of men owning an informal business increased by about 0.01, or 8 percent.  
Next, we exploit the panel structure of the ENE data to split up the impact of Banco 
Azteca opening by the four different possible pre-event occupations: informal business 
owner, formal business owner, wage-earner and not employed (which includes the 
unemployed and those out of labor force). In other words, we study how the transition 
between these 4 categories changed due to Banco Azteca opening. Column 1 of Table 3 
reports our results for the informal business owner dummy as the outcome variable. To save 
space, only coefficients on the interaction term Azteca* Post Dec 2002 are reported, along 
with their standard errors. The regressions include individual control variables and 
municipality specific time trends.  
Column 1 shows that the increase in informal business is due to the fact that those 
that had an informal business before Azteca opened are more likely to continue operating an 
informal business after Azteca opened. Moreover, the other coefficients in Row 1 show that 
pre-event informal business owners were less likely to be not employed or wage-earners after 
Banco Azteca opened.  This suggests that the increased availability of financial services 
helped existing informal business to continue their operations, rather than closing the 
business and transitioning into wage-earner or not employed status. 
 
                                                 
16 In our sample, 34% of all informal business owners are women, while 28% of all formal business owners are 
women.    14
IV. b. Wage Earners and Employment 
  In Table 4 we investigate the impact of Azteca opening on wage earners. We find that 
overall there is no statistically significant impact of the bank opening on the number of wage 
earners. However, when we estimate our model separately for men and women, we find that 
Banco Azteca opening led to an increase in the fraction of female wage-earners. The results 
for men are not statistically significant in our preferred specifications with time trends. It is 
plausible that increased availability of credit allowed men to start or expand their informal 
businesses, which then in turn employed women as wage-earners. In other words, an owner 
of an informal business may employ his wife and other female household members, who are 
then being recorded as wage-earners in our sample. 
Note that overall, the opening of Banco Azteca increased employment both for men 
and women (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4). Men were more likely to work as informal 
business owners, but not less likely to work as wage earners or registered business owners, 
implying an overall increase in employment. Women were more likely to work as wage 
earners, but not less likely to work as business owners, also implying an increase in 
employment. The effects in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 correspond to an increase in 
employment of about 1.4 percent over the pre-event level in the full sample. 
When examining the effect of Banco Azteca opening on the fraction of wage earners 
and on employment by pre-event occupation, we find that the not employed are less likely to 
remain not employed after the event. Those previously not employed transitioned to working 
as informal business owners or wage-earners. However, these effects are only marginally 
statistically significant (p-value of 0.11 for the informal business owner dummy and of 0.14 
for the wage-earner dummy).   15
IV. c. Income 
Next, we investigate the impact of Banco Azteca opening on household income. 
Table 5 presents our results for two measures of income: the log of income +1 and the forth 
root of income. We chose these two transformations of income as outcome variables since 
they allow us to include zero incomes. That is, they allow us to examine the impact of Banco 
Azteca on the income of the complete sample, including the not employed that have zero 
income. It is important to include the not employed in the income analysis since we find an 
increase in employment due to Banco Azteca opening.  
The results in Column 1 of Table 5 are negative and not statistically significant. 
However, this is the specification without time trends and our analysis of pre-event changes 
in Section 4 suggests that we may underestimate the effect of Banco Azteca on income if we 
do not control for different time trend across municipalities. The specifications with time 
trends in Columns 2 and 3 show a statistically significant increase in both of our measures of 
income. The effects are similar for men and women (Panels B and C). If anything, the 
magnitude of the effect is larger for women – for example the coefficient on our variable of 
interest is 0.09 for women vs. 0.048 for men (Column 3).  
  We also examine the fraction of individuals earning above minimum wage as an 
outcome variable. This allows us to capture the 4.2 percent of employed individuals that do 
not report their income directly, but that report it in terms of bins relative to the minimum 
wage. However, we do not find any significant impact on the proportion of people receiving 
income above the minimum wage. It could be that the increase in income happened for low 
income individuals and that it was insufficient to raise them above the minimum wage level. 
Nevertheless, we observe an overall positive increase in income, which suggests that an 
increase in the availability of financial services for low income individuals can help some 
people improve their living standards, even if such an improvement is not enough to raise 
them completely out of poverty.    
  Finally, in Table 3 (Columns 5 and 6) we explore the impact on income levels for the 
four pre-event occupation groups. We find that only those in the previously not employed 
category have a significant increase in income. This mirrors our finding that the previously 
not employed transition into being either informal business owners or wage earners. The 
impact on income for previous informal business owners is also positive, amounting to an   16
increase of about 7 percent. However, this effect is not statistically significant since the 
standard error is quite big. It is possible that there is a lot of noise in this estimate since 
informal business owners may be reluctant to report their true income on the survey. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper shows that expanding access to finance to low-income individuals can 
have a positive effect on economic activity. We examine the case of Banco Azteca in 
Mexico, which opened over 800 branches overnight in 2002, targeting their savings account 
and loan services mainly to low income individuals and informal business owners. 
Our results suggest that Banco Azteca helped informal business owners to keep their 
business running instead of transitioning into being wage earners or not employed. The 
fraction of informal business owners increased by 7.6 percent. This increase came exclusive 
from male owned businesses, not female owned businesses. Employment also increased by 
about 1.4 percent as a result of Azteca opening. Women were more likely to work as wage 
earners after Azteca opened and some previously not-employed individuals became informal 
business owners and wage earners. The rise in informal business and employment also led to 
an increase in income of about 7 percent on average. 
Overall, these findings support the existing literature that has pointed towards a 
connection between access to finance and growth and poverty alleviation. They also shed 
new light on the channels through which access to finance for low-income individuals 
promotes economic development, namely by fostering the survival and creation of informal 
businesses. 
Moreover, our results add to the evidence on the effects of microfinance since 
operationally Banco Azteca resembles a microfinance institution. It is sometimes argued that 
micro loans represent a transfer to the poor that is not put to a productive use. However, our 
results suggest that this not the case and that providing financial services to the poor can 
indeed generate additional economic activity.   17
Appendix. 
 
Banco Azteca Serves Low-Income Customers 
 
As of the opening date, “the bank was the first and only all-Mexican-owned franchise to be 
licensed by the Finance Ministry since 1994. It is also the first bank to aim at Mexico's 
middle and working classes: the 73 million people who live in households with combined 




Before Azteca, access to credit was largely unavailable to millions of informal businesses, 
such as taxi drivers, plumbers or street merchants. Banco Azteca officials claimed that credit 
will be more available to Mexico's large informal sector, the small businesses and self-
employed who operate outside regulatory frameworks.
 18  
 
“Banco Azteca SA, a new bank belonging to retail giant Grupo Elektra SA, wants to woo the 
millions of teachers, plumbers, cabbies and sidewalk vendors who traditional banks have 
long shunned.” "Mexican banks are focused on the sectors with the highest income," said 
Carlos Septien, Banco Azteca's chief executive officer. "We're aiming for the C and D 
segments, which represent 70 percent of the population, or about 16 million families."
19 
 
Commenting on the start-up of operations of the bank, Ricardo B. Salinas, Chairman of the 
Board of Grupo Elektra, stressed that: "Banco Azteca will improve access to goods and 
services for our people. A major impediment to the growth of the Mexican middle class has 
been the lack of access to credit, one of the main vehicles for personal financial 
improvement. Banco Azteca will demonstrate the importance of offering financial services to 
this under- served segment of the Mexican population." (Reuters, 2002)  
 
Banco Azteca benefited from synergies with their retail operations, which provided a rich 
source of data on their customers. With Elektra's 48 years of know-how in loaning to lower-
income consumers, the Banco Azteca obtained information on about 4 million borrowers. 
Many of those customers buy Elektra's products, develop film at its stores or receive money 
transfers from the United States through Western Union. “We know this segment of Mexican 
society better than anyone else,'' says Banco Azteca President Carlos Septien.
20  “The 
sophisticated technology and collection systems already in place at Grupo Elektra will 
provide us with invaluable data about our customers' buying habits and financial needs, 
allowing us to succeed."   
 
The group has spent $20 million a year over three years on information technology, including 
high-tech “fingerprint readers” that eliminate the need for customers to present IDs or 
passbooks. The bank also commands a 3,000-strong army of motorcycle-riding loan agents. 
                                                 
17 The New York Times, 31 December 2002.  
18 The New York Times, 31 December 2002. 
19 By Brendan M. Case, The Dallas Morning News, 31 October 2002. 
20 Business Week, 13 January 2003 
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They tote Compaq iPAQ handheld computers loaded with Elektra's rich database, which 




"The difference between Elektra and more established banks is that Elektra has a much better 
collection system," said Joaquin Lopez-Doriga, an analyst with Deutsche-Ixe. "If you want to 




The bank began operations by offering savings accounts that could be opened with as little as 
$5. In the first month, 157,000 accounts had been opened. By the end of December 2002, 
more than 250,000 accounts had been opened.  
 
In December 2002, Banco Azteca received authorization to make loans, and has begun 
offering consumer financing identical to the installment plans of the Grupo Elektra retailers 
and has also begun offering $500 personal loans not tied to appliance purchases. Elektra's old 
consumer financing operation closed down as its borrowers paid off their loans, which 
usually run for 53 weeks. 
 
After less then a year of operations, Banko Azteca “has seen rapid success as it taps Mexico's 
vast informal economy, thanks to Elektra's long record of serving the working class.”
23 
 
Below are several anecdotal accounts from the press, on the typical customers of Banco 
Azteca.  
 
Banco Azteca bikers reach out to Mexico's poor.  
By Lorraine Orlandi, 21 September 2003, Reuters News, (c) 2003 Reuters Limited  
 
Loan officers make house calls to investigate potential customers and to ensure they make 
payments once a loan is approved. Sometimes they repossess items that are resold at Elektra's 
Bodega de Remates discount stores, typically at prices higher than the amount due on the 
loan.  
On a recent afternoon Azteca loan officer Manuel Monroy hopped on a Honda 125 to visit 
Blanca Guevara at home in a working-class neighborhood of Mexico City. The 48-year-old 
widow had applied to buy a sewing machine for 2,174 pesos (about $210) on credit at Elektra 
the day before.  
Guevara said she could pay 41 pesos a week over 53 weeks, after a 141-peso down payment. 
But as an off-the-books house cleaner, she had no proof of income.  
Once her mother-in-law, who owns their house, agreed to back the loan, Monroy looked over 
property and identification papers and recorded the information on a hand-held computer.  
                                                 
21 Business Week, 13 January 2003 
22 Reuters News, 21 September 2003 
23 Reuters News, 21 September 2003 
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The software analyzed the information and within minutes a verdict flashed on the 
computer's tiny screen: "Approved." He pressed another button to produce a ticket from a 
printer on his belt for Guevara to present at the store.  
 
BUY A TOASTER, OPEN A BANK ACCOUNT 
Banco Azteca caters to the little guy--in appliance stores  
By Geri Smith in Mexico City  
13 January 2003 BusinessWeek 54, Number 3815 
(Copyright 2003 McGraw-Hill, Inc.)  
 
Pedro Rubio was in a bind. The 56-year-old carpenter needed to come up with thousands of 
pesos in notary fees to get legal title to his modest cinderblock house. Otherwise, he feared 
that squatters would stake claim to it when he was away working at construction sites. But 
Rubio, who earns the equivalent of $600 a month, had no proof of income and no bank 
account.  
So on a recent morning, he walked through his gritty Mexico City neighborhood to an 
Elektra appliance store. At the back, behind an aisle of microwave ovens, he sat down with a 
loan officer from a new bank, Banco Azteca. Unfazed by Rubio's worn jeans and unshaven 
face, the officer drew up an inventory of his possessions: TV, refrigerator, washing machine-
-all bought on credit at Elektra in the past three years. Accepting these as collateral, the bank 
approved Rubio's application within 24 hours. The nine-month, $200 loan carries a 48% 
annual interest rate, usurious by U.S. standards but not in Mexico, where the banking sector 
is still recovering from the effects of the 1994 peso crash. ``It's a little expensive,'' says 
Rubio. Still, he says he can swing the weekly $8 payments. In any event, he adds, “I don't 
really have any other option.” 
 
   20
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Figure 4: Average of Informal Businesses Owner Dummy for Municipalities with and 
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Table 1: Pre-Azteca Averages of Individual Level Variables  





in Dec 2002 
Municipalities 
without Azteca, 
but with other 





 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Outcome Variables Levels       
Informal business owner dummy  0.0821 0.1380  -0.0560*** 
 (0.2745)  (0.3449)  (0.0087) 
Formal business owner dummy  0.0790 0.0656 0.0134*** 
  (0.2697) (0.2475)  (0.0033) 
Wage earner dummy  0.4969  0.4403  0.0566*** 
 (0.5000)  (0.4964)  (0.0111) 
Not Employed dummy  0.3417  0.3560  -0.0143** 
 (0.4743)  (0.4788)  (0.0067) 
Above minimum wage dummy  0.5827  0.4763  0.1064*** 
 (0.4931)  (0.4994)  (0.0161) 
Log monthly income +1  4.9999  4.4705  0.5294*** 
 (3.9346)  (3.8103)  0.0918 
Outcome Variables Changes       
Informal business owner change -0.0023  -0.0010  -0.0013 
 (0.0388)  (0.0551)  0.0021 
Formal business owner change 0.0049  0.0055  -0.0005 
  (0.0264) (0.0360)  (0.0014) 
Wage earner change  -0.0038  0.0031  -0.0068*** 
 (0.0486)  (0.0690)  (0.0026) 
Not Employed change  0.0012  -0.0075  0.0087*** 
 (0.0467)  (0.0649)  (0.0025) 
Above minimum wage change  0.0001  0.0059  -0.0059** 
 (0.0516)  (0.0650)  (0.0026) 
Log monthly income change  0.0311  0.0982  -0.0671*** 
 (0.3612)  (0.4593)  (0.0182) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). The employed include wage 
earners and self-employed/business owners. Changes are changes in ENE municipality averages 
from one quarter to the same quarter of the next year, using data from 2000-II to 2002-III 
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Table 2: Impact on Entrepreneurial Activity 
  Dependent variable: 
  Informal business  
owner dummy     Formal business  
owner dummy 
 (1)  (2)  (3)      (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A: Complete Sample           
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  0.0062**  0.0062**  0.0067**    -0.0039*  -0.0011  -0.0003 
 (0.0027)  (0.0028)  (0.0027)    (0.0022)  (0.0021)  (0.0021) 
R-squared 0.069  0.057  0.069    0.051  0.047  0.052 
No. of observations  4,728,268  4,728,268 4,728,268    4,728,268  4,728,268 4,728,268 
           
Panel B: Women           
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  -0.0016  0.0033  0.0042    -0.0013  0.0010  0.0009 
 (0.0020)  (0.0026)  (0.0027)    (0.0015)  (0.0017)  (0.0018) 
R-squared 0.031  0.019  0.032    0.013  0.009  0.014 
No. of observations  2,515,225  2,515,225 2,515,225     2,515,225  2,515,225 2,515,225 
           
Panel C: Men           
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  0.0158*** 0.0091*  0.0101**    -0.0065*  -0.0037  -0.0018 
 (0.0053)  (0.0051)  (0.0047)    (0.0039)  (0.0037)  (0.0035) 
R-squared 0.099  0.077  0.102    0.053  0.046  0.054 
No. of observations  2,213,043  2,213,043 2,213,043     2,213,043  2,213,043 2,213,043 
              
Group time trend   No    Yes    No      No    Yes    No  
Municipality time trend   No    No    Yes      No    No    Yes  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality 
fixed effects, as well as individual level control variables. Individual level control variables are gender, age, marital 
status, and education dummies. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
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Table 3: Impact on Dependent Variable by Pre-Event Occupation 
                    
  Dependent variable: 
 Informal  Formal  Wage-
earners  Not employed  Log           
(1+ income) 
Fourth root of 
income  
Pre-Event 
Occupation           
Informal 0.0394***  0.0016  -0.0280**  -0.0130*  0.0721  0.0639 
  (0.0148)  (0.0084)  (0.0116)  (0.0078) (0.0648) (0.0638) 
           
Formal -0.0017  -0.0204  0.0117  0.0103  -0.0116  0.0681 
  (0.0107)  (0.0195)  (0.0130)  (0.0104) (0.1143) (0.1255) 
           
Wage  Earners  0.0019 0.0015  -0.0019  -0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0092 
  (0.0034)  (0.0020)  (0.0054)  (0.0043) (0.0451) (0.0431) 
           
Not Employed  0.0053  0.0023  0.0088  -0.0165**  0.0868*  0.0751* 
  (0.0033)  (0.0019)  (0.0059)  (0.0069) (0.0492) (0.0444) 
Note: Reported are coefficients on interaction term of Azteca* Post Dec 2002 estimated with municipality time trends. Standard errors 
in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as individual level 
control variables. Individual level control variables are gender, age, marital status, and education dummies. Significance levels: * 10%, 
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Table 4: Impact on Wage Earners and Employment 
   Dependent variable: 
  Wage earner dummy     Not Employed dummy 
 (1)  (2)  (3)      (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A. Complete Sample             
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  -0.0042  0.0039  0.0034    0.0019  -0.0089*** -0.0098*** 
 (0.0035)  (0.0040)  (0.0038)    (0.0032)  (0.0034)  (0.0034) 
R-squared 0.140  0.136  0.141    0.230  0.226  0.230 
No. of observations  4,728,268  4,728,268 4,728,268    4,728,268  4,728,268  4,728,268 
              
Panel B: Women             
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  0.0033  0.0095**  0.0108**    -0.0004  -0.0138**  -0.0159*** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0044)  (0.0045)    (0.0052)  (0.0054)  (0.0054) 
R-squared 0.139  0.133  0.140      0.109  0.119 
No. of observations  2,515,225  2,515,225 2,515,225    2,515,225  2,515,225  2,515,225 
              
Panel C: Men             
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  -0.0135***  -0.0030  -0.0055    0.0041  -0.0024  -0.0027 
 (0.0048)  (0.0057)  (0.0054)    (0.0026)  (0.0032)  (0.0031) 
R-squared 0.075  0.065  0.076    0.089  0.083  0.0893 
No. of observations  2,213,043  2,213,043 2,213,043    2,213,043  2,213,043  2,213,043 
                       
Group time trend   No    Yes    No      No    Yes    No  
Municipality time trend   No    No    Yes      No    No    Yes  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed 
effects, as well as individual level control variables. Individual level control variables are gender, age, marital status, and 
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Table 5: Impact on Income  
   Dependent variable: 
  Log (1+ income)  Fourth root income   Above minimum wage dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
Panel A. Complete 
Sample             
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  -0.0283  0.0691** 0.0762***  -0.0155  0.0577** 0.0660***    -0.0077*  0.0030  0.0033 
 (0.0240)  (0.0286)  (0.0275)  (0.0242)  (0.0269) (0.0255)  (0.0042)  (0.0036) (0.0032) 
R-squared  0.279 0.274 0.280 0.311 0.302 0.311  0.270  0.259 0.271 
No. of observations  4,533,848  4,533,848  4,533,848  4,533,848  4,533,848  4,533,848  4,644,097  4,644,097  4,644,097 
               
Panel B: Women             
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  -0.0063  0.0712* 0.0907**  0.0093 0.0550  0.0727** -0.0031 0.0041  0.0058 
 (0.0327)  (0.0389)  (0.0388)  (0.0295)  (0.0351) (0.0350)  (0.0041)  (0.0041) (0.0040) 
R-squared  0.149 0.141 0.150 0.171 0.163 0.172  0.160  0.151 0.161 
No. of observations  2,452,291  2,452,291  2,452,291  2,452,291  2,452,291  2,452,291  2,488,115  2,488,115  2,488,115 
               
Table C: Men             
Azteca*Post Dec 2002  -0.0538**  0.0541* 0.0483* -0.0451 0.0500  0.0479*  -0.0134** 0.0003 -0.0015 
 (0.0269)  (0.0308)  (0.0290)  (0.0295)  (0.0307) (0.0280)  (0.0058)  (0.0050) (0.0045) 
R-squared  0.139 0.125 0.140 0.185 0.159 0.186  0.134  0.101 0.137 
No. of observations  2,081,557  2,081,557  2,081,557  2,081,557  2,081,557  2,081,557  2,155,982  2,155,982  2,155,982 
                             
Group time trend   No    Yes    No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes    No  
Municipality time trend   No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as 
individual level control variables. Individual level control variables are gender, age, marital status, and education dummies. Significance levels: 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 